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1

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellee seeks to sustain judgment of the trial
court.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
After a trial on the merits the Court denied Appellant's
claim and entered decree reforming instrument so that it complied
with agreement made at the time of the sale.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellee seeks to have the decision of the Lower Court
sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September of 1968, Appellees, as Sellers, and
Appellant, as Purchaser, entered into an agreement for the sale
of the surface rights of 54 acres of Appellees1 land located in
Duchesne County, Utah, together with 31 shares of water and a
mobile home for a total purchase price of $7000.00. An Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was executed on or about
September 12, 1968.

On November 10, 1968, Appellees and Appellant

executed an Uniform Real Estate Contract for the purchase of the
property agreed upon.

On October 30, 196 9, Appellees executed a

Warranty Deed in favor of Appellant including a right of way to
and from the land and 31 shares of Dry Gulch Irrigation Company.

2

The Earnest Money Receipt, the Uniform Real Estate
Contract, and the Warranty Deed were prepared by Appellant or
at Appellant's instructions.
At the time of the execution of those documents, the
Appellees were the owners of only one-fourth of the mineral
rights.

Appellant was aware of this at the time she prepared the

documents of sale.

No mention of the mineral rights is made in

any of the documents of sale nor in the deed.
Appellee, Mr. Forrer, testified that just prior to
signing of the Earnest Money Receipt and again prior to the
execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, he walked over the
land with the Appellant and told her that no minerals went with
the land and that Appellant replied that she was not interested
in the minerals but only wanted a place for her cattle.
Appellant testified that there was no discussion of the
minerals except that Appellee, Mr. Forrer, gave her a copy of an
escrow agreement executed in 1951 indicating that Appellee, Mr.
Forrer, together with his brother then owned a one-fourth interest
Appellee testified that he did not have such a meeting with the
Appellant and that he had not had a copy of the escrow agreement
since he signed it over to his brother 13 years ago.
The testimonv of the Aooellee. Mr- Forrer, was

-3-

corroborated by the stipulated testimony of Appellee, Mrs.
Forrer.

Appellant's testimony is uncorroborated.
In July of 1970, the Appellees were contacted by Mr.

Howell Spear to whom they sold their interest in the minerals
for $500.00. Appellant made no effort to lease or sell the
minerals, nor to collect the lease payments or to have the deed
reformed until just shortly before this suit was brought in 1975.
I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE
TO REFORM THE DEED.
The deed and instruments of sale were silent concerning
the mineral rights, yet the Appellees owned only a one-fourth
interest therein which they claimed to have reserved and which
Appellant claims should pass by operation of law.

Parol evidence

has been readily allowed by this Court to determine the actual
intent of the parties where the parties omitted the mineral rights
from the deed.

In Bench v Pace, 538 P 2d 180 (1975), this Court

sustained Judge Sorensen's admission of parol evidence to establish
the clear agreement of the parties with regard to the mineral rights.
In that opinion the Supreme Court of Utah cited Sine v Harper, 118
Utah 415, 222 P 2d 571 and E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc.
v Broderick, Utah, 522 P 2d 144 (1974) in support of this rule.
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The general proposition is stated by Professor Corbin at Contracts
Section 536.
"Before the legal operation of any agreement can
be determined, however definitely it may be embodied
in a written "integration11, it must be interpreted
by the Court. For this process of interpretation,
the "parol evidence rule" does not exclude evidence
of prior communications and understandings (although
there may be some other limitations on the extent to
which such evidence may be used). Until a contract
has been interpreted, the Court cannot know whether
there is an inconsistency between it and other
agreements, oral or written, prior or subsequent.
Before interpretation, a Court cannot know what it
is that cannot be "varied or contradicted". In
addition, the rule does not purport to exclude any
testimony to prove fraud, illegality, accident, or
mistake, it does not prevent rescission or a decree
for reformation and enforcement."
In E.A. Strout Western Realty supra this Court stated:
"Parol evidence may be received to clarify ambiguous
language in a contract, to show what the agreement
was relative to filling in blanks, and to supply
omitted terms which were agreed upon but inadvertantly
left out of the written agreement."
The Trial Court in this case correctly allowed parol
evidence to interpret the written instruments because they were
ambiguous and failed to express the parties understanding.

It

would be repugnant to law and equity to allow the Appellant to
employ the parol evidence rule to hide the true and concurring
intent of the parties.

5

II
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO REFORM THE DEED TO CONFORM WITH THE ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES,
This case is comparable to the recent case of Bench
v Pace, supra.

In that case, as in this case, the conduct of

the plaintiff showed that they made no claim to the minerals
until shortly before the suit was initiated some five years
following execution of the agreement.

Accordingly the controlling

written instrument was interpreted to include such a reservation
even though the instrument contained no provision relating to the
oil and mineral estate.
The legal standard of Bench v Pace is stated at 123
. . . in view of all the circumstances it appears
the omission was an oversight on the part of the
scrivener and the parties to the contract, and
the conduct of the plaintiffs clearly shows they
made no claim to the mineral estate until shortly
before this suit was initiated.
Thus, the Court looks to all the circumstances including
the conduct of the parties. Furthermore, in evaluating the findings
of the Trial Court the evidence to sustain the judgment need not
be uncontradicted.

Weight should be given to the opportunity

of the Trial Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.

As

was stated by this Court in Naisbitt v Hodges 6 Utah 2d 116, 307
P 2d 620 (1957)
All that is required is that evidence exists
whereby this court can say that the trial judge
acted as a reasonable man in finding that the
proof of the fact asserted is greater than a
mere preponderance.
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It is not required that the testimony be uncontradicted
to be clear and convincing.

In Neal v Green, 71 Wash. 2d 40, 426

P 2d 485 (1967) the Court relied on the Trial Court!s evaluation
of the creditability of the witnesses and the conduct of the
parties to uphold the reformation of the deed.

The Court said:

"There was conflict in the testimony. But this
does not mean that the Court must deny reformation.
'Certainty of error1 is not the same as
'uncontradicted testimony of error.f "
See also, Wright v Brem, 467 P 2d 736, 81 N.M. 410 (1970),
and Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3 (1950), Section 615 and cases cited.
In Nelson v Dougherty, Okla. 357 P 2d 425 (1960) the
Court said:
"Evidence to sustain a judgment preforming a written
contract must be clear, unequivocal, and decisive,
but this does not mean that it must be uncontradicted;
and the judgment of the Trial Court in such action,
where the evidence is conflicting, should be given
weight, and should be affirmed on appeal, unless the
Appellate Court is satisfied that the standard of
proof required has not been met and the conclusion
reached is wrong.
* * * *

"In Crabb v Chisum, 183 Okl. 138, 80 P 2d 653, we
considered a case where the factual situation was
very similar to that involved in the instant case.
The mistake in the notes in that case was due to an
error on the part of the scrivener, which was not
noticed by the plaintiff until long subsequent to
the date of the execution of the notes. In that
case we affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court
granting reformation, although the evidence was
conflicting, pointing out that the Trial Court,
which had the witnesses before it and had an
opportunity to observe their demeanor and to
determine their credibility, had decided this
issue in favor of the plaintiffs.11
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The evidence in the instant case adequately supports
the findings of the Trial Court.

The Appellee testified that he

twice told the Appellant that he was not conveying the minerals
and that the Appellant stated that she was only interested in
land for her cattle (T.T. pp. 62,63, and 66). The Appellee only
owned an one-fourth mineral interest as Appellant knew, yet
Appellant, an experienced and liscensed real estate saleswoman,
prepared the agreements and did not include any reference to the
mineral estate although the deed specifically listed the right of
way and water rights (T.T. p. 27 and Exhibit C).

The testimony of

Mr. Forrer is corroborated by the stipulated testimony of Mrs.
Forrer (T.T. p. 77). Appellant did not attempt to sell or lease
the minerals between 1968, the date of the sale, and the bringing
of this suit in 1975 despite increased speculation in oil and gas
in the area (T.T. p. 74). Nor did Appellant attempt to collect
the rental even though she knew the minerals were under lease
(T.T. p. 12) .
In addition to the foregoing facts, the relative
experience of the parties is significant.

Appellees are elderly

and without experience in selling real estate and stated that they
believed that for the minerals to be included they should be listed,
as were the water and rights of way.

Appellant, an experienced

real estate saleswoman, came to the Appellees for a listing, but
bought the property herself, subtracting a $600.00 commission out
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of the $1000.00 down payment.

Appellant now seeks to rely on

a legal presumption and the parol evidence rule which she wasnft
aware of at the time, to claim damages of $1000.00 per acre.
These circumstances and the corroborated testimony of the
Appellee thus adequately supports the findings of the Trial Court.
Ill
THE MUTUAL MISTAKE IS NOT OF THE TYPE WHICH PRECLUDES
REFORMATION OF THE DEED.
Based on his conversations with the Appellant upon whom he
relied to prepare the documents of sale and in light of other
items listed on the deed as included, Appellees understood the
deed to reserve them the minerals.

This is not unusual for a

layman to rely on his listing real estate agent in this fashion*
It is more unusual that the Appellant failed to expressly list the
one-fourth mineral interest.

In fact, it is this mutual mistake

which gave rise to the admission of parol evidence and reformation.
For negligence to prohibit reformation, it must be the sole cause
of the oversight and a violation of a positive legal duty that
prejudices the other party.
As was stated by this court in McMahon v Tanner, 122 Utah 333
249 P 2d 502 (19

):

"The type of negligence which will preclude a
party from securing equitable relief of the nature
here demanded is thus stated in Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., Sec. 856:

-9-

'As a second requisite, it has sometimes
been said in very general terms that a
mistake resulting from the complaining
partyfs own negligence will never be
relieved. This proposition is not
sustained by the authorities. It would
be more accurate to say that where the
mistake is wholly caused by the want of
that care and diligence in the transaction
which should be used by every person of
reasonable prudence, and the absence of
which would be a violation of the legal
duty, a court of equity will not interpose
its relief; but even with this more guarded
mode of statement, each instance of negligence
must depend to a great extent upon its own
circumstances. It is not every negligence
that will stay the hand of the court. The
conclusion from the best authorities seems
to be, that the neglect must amount to the
violation of a positive legal duty. The
highest possible care is not demanded.
Even clearly established negligence may not
of itself be a sufficient ground for refusing
relief, if it appears: that the other party
has not been prejudiced thereby.' "
This is the general rule applied in the majority of cases.
See Carpenter v Hill 131 Colo. 553, 283 P 2d 963 (

);

Seydin v Frade, 88 Nev. 174, 494 P 2d 128 (1972); and Thorsteinsonv Waters, 65 Wash. Ed 739, 399 P 2d 510 (1965).
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court in the instant case correctly admitted the
parol evidence and reformed the deed to conform to the initial
agreement between the parties.

There was no negligence in this

case of the type that would preclude reformation of the deed.
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The deed did not express the understanding of the parties and
was clearly ambiguous.

The clear and convincing evidence before

the Trial Court was that no mineral estate was intended to pass
to the Appellant.

Respectfully submitted,
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